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Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets

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  • Suil Pae

Abstract

This paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two‐period oligopoly model. An incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period, and then competes against an entrant in the second period. Two main results are derived. First, it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre‐committing to disclose both the demand and cost information. By disclosing full information, the incumbent nullifies its self‐defeating intertemporal incentives, which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand, its cost efficiency, or both. In addition, the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure, which benefits the incumbent ex ante. Second, the paper shows that the incumbent’s full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint. In particular, the correlation between the firms’ production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Suil Pae, 2002. "Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 901-932, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:40:y:2002:i:3:p:901-932
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.00076
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    Cited by:

    1. Amir, Rabah & Jin, Jim Y. & Troege, Michael, 2010. "Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 855-866, September.
    2. Göttsche, Max & Küster, Stephan & Steindl, Tobias, 2021. "The usefulness of Non-IFRS segment data," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    3. Bruce Ian Carlin & Shaun William Davies & Andrew Miles Iannaccone, 2010. "Competing for Attention in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Orhun, Eda, 2019. "Voluntary disclosure and market competition: Theory and evidence from the U.S. services sector," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 354-370.
    5. Tianle Song, 2022. "Quality Disclosure and Product Selection," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 323-346, June.
    6. Tarun Khanna & Krishna G. Palepu & Suraj Srinivasan, 2004. "Disclosure Practices of Foreign Companies Interacting with U.S. Markets," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 475-508, May.
    7. Zhong, Rong (Irene), 2018. "Transparency and firm innovation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 67-93.
    8. Feng Gao & Rong Zhong, 2023. "Information environment and interfirm alliance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 643-677, February.
    9. Kazunori Miwa, 2021. "An Experimental Study on Information Acquisition and Disclosure in a Cournot Duopoly Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    10. Kazunori Miwa, 2016. "Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2016-17, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    11. Dainelli, Francesco & Bini, Laura & Giunta, Francesco, 2013. "Signaling strategies in annual reports: Evidence from the disclosure of performance indicators," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 267-277.

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