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Vertical Contracts That Reference Rivals

Author

Listed:
  • Fan Liu

    (Nankai University)

  • David S. Sibley

    (The University of Texas at Austin)

  • Wei Zhao

    (Competition Economics LLC)

Abstract

We study two types of vertical contracts that reference rivals: the “vertical price constraint” (VPC) requires retail prices for a manufacturer’s product to be no higher than for its competitors’ products. The “vertical margin constraint” (VMC) requires retail margins for a manufacturer’s product to be no higher than for its competitors’ products. These agreements are found in the soft drink and cigarette industries, and in travel platforms. With two asymmetric manufacturers, we find that only the larger adopts a VPC in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We also analyze incentive compatibility issues with optional VPC agreements. Apart from leading to increased prices, the VPC leads to lower profits for the smaller manufacturer. In contrast, the VMC leads to lower prices. Under certain conditions, by adopting the VMC, a larger manufacturer will gain enough to compensate the retailer and still be better off, while making its competitor worse off. These two vertical contracts work because they alter the price elasticities of demand that face upstream manufacturers.

Suggested Citation

  • Fan Liu & David S. Sibley & Wei Zhao, 2020. "Vertical Contracts That Reference Rivals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(2), pages 381-407, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:56:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09702-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09702-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johansen, Bjørn Olav & Vergé, Thibaud, 2017. "Platform price parity clauses with direct sales," Working Papers in Economics 01/17, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
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    3. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
    4. Justin P. Johnson, 2017. "The Agency Model and MFN Clauses," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(3), pages 1151-1185.
    5. Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, 2016. "The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 105-134.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical contract; Vertical restraint; Margin constraint; Every day low price;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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