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Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence

Author

Listed:
  • Morgane Cure

    (CREST, ENSAE Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Matthias Hunold

    (University of Siegen)

  • Reinhold Kesler

    (University of Zurich)

  • Ulrich Laitenberger

    (i3, Telecom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris
    CRED - Université Paris II)

  • Thomas Larrieu

    (Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

Meta-search platforms, which enable consumers to compare product prices between different sales channels, are sometimes integrated with certain channels. A case in point is the online hotel booking industry where the major online travel agencies are integrated with meta-search platforms. Studying web-scraped data from the meta-search platform Kayak, we find indications that, for a given hotel, the offers of affiliated online travel agents (like Booking.com) are more visible than those of other online travel agents with the same price. Moreover, hotels appear to be less prominent in Kayak’s search results when the rival online travel agent Expedia has the lowest price.

Suggested Citation

  • Morgane Cure & Matthias Hunold & Reinhold Kesler & Ulrich Laitenberger & Thomas Larrieu, 2022. "Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 353-395, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:20:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11129-022-09255-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11129-022-09255-4
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Meta-search; Hotel booking; Online travel agents; Ranking; Algorithm bias;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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