Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 35-52
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:32:y:2008:i:1:p:35-52

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords: Collusion; Communication; Price cycle; War of attrition; Pricing coordination;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-65, Autumn.
   Other versions:
   • Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," Working papers 99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
2. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
4. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
5. Eckert, Andrew, 2003. "Retail price cycles and the presence of small firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 151-170, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Eckert, Andrew & West, Douglas S, 2004. "Retail Gasoline Price Cycles across Spatially Dispersed Gasoline Stations," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 245-73, April.
7. Ola Andersson & Erik Wengström, 2007. "Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 109(2), pages 321-339, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2004. "Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies," Working Papers 2004:14, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
8. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.