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Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?

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  • James Griffith
  • Charles Knoeber

Abstract

Treating corporate contributions as purchases of valuable inputs, we hypothesize that firms for which genetic diversity, advertizing, and reputations of environmental responsibility are more valuable and firms for which the cost of contributing is less will be more likely contributors to the Nature Conservancy. These hypotheses are supported by logit estimations which find firms in industries where biological inputs are important, firms with high advertizing expenditures, firms in industries with high costs of meeting environmental regulations, and large firms are more likely to contribute and so become Corporate Associates of the Nature Conservancy. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • James Griffith & Charles Knoeber, 1986. "Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 69-77, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:49:y:1986:i:1:p:69-77
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00163531
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
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