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Revealed public preference and social utility

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  • Perry Shapiro

Abstract

Methods of demand theory are applied to the problem of the existence of a social welfare function under specific public choice algorithms. Integrability conditions, necessary for the derivation of social demand functions from utility maximization, are used. The social choice function, which chooses the mean of all voters demand for public goods to be the public provision, is analysed in detail. Necessary conditions for the existence of a social utility function, and by implication, a transative social ordering, are derived for this case. These conditions imply restrictions on individual preferences. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Social Sciences Division 1978

Suggested Citation

  • Perry Shapiro, 1978. "Revealed public preference and social utility," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 103-115, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:33:y:1978:i:2:p:103-115
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118360
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ledyard, John O. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1972. "Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 144-153, April.
    2. Howard R. Bowen, 1943. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(1), pages 27-48.
    3. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shawna Grosskopf & Kathy Hayes, 1983. "Do Local Governments Maximize Anything?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(2), pages 202-216, April.

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