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What drives the regional disparities in municipal national health insurance premiums?

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  • Kurono, Ruka

Abstract

There are large disparities in premium level among the Municipal National Health Insurance (NHI) programs in Japan. As municipalities have discretion when setting the NHI premiums, they may determine their premiums observing how large or small the premiums of their neighbors are. This study examined how such reference behavior affects the NHI premium level and to what extent it explains the premium disparities. The results revealed that there was positive reference behavior among neighboring insurers which explains 7.2% of the NHI premium disparity.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurono, Ruka, 2022. "What drives the regional disparities in municipal national health insurance premiums?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:61:y:2022:i:c:s0922142522000032
    DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2022.101117
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Municipal national health insurance; Spatial autocorrelation; Panel data; Maximum Likelihood method;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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