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The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective

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  • Anthony Gill

    (University of Washington)

Abstract

All of the major religious confessions existing today have outlasted every single secular ruling regime known in human history. That observation poses an interesting puzzle for social scientists interested in institutional durability. If religions can be seen as governance institutions that organize and coordinate people’s lives, why have they outlasted secular states? Despite claims regarding the inevitability of secularization, religious institutions refuse to fade from the social landscape and in many places are thriving and expanding. I argue that the durability of religious institutions relative to secular governing regimes is related to the unique ability of religions to avoid the public choice “paradox of government” as laid out by James Buchanan. More precisely, religious institutions are more resilient because they effectively provide vital public goods, involve “citizens” in the process of governance at the local level, and provide a credible neutral arbitrator for violations of the governing covenant. A further argument is made for the efficiency of religious institutions relative to states based on the smaller deadweight losses associated with participatory governance. Finally, state-sponsored confessions expose themselves to the paradox of government and become less effective in pursuing their missions.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Gill, 2021. "The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 313-334, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:189:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00842-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00842-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2023. "Serving two masters: the effect of state religion on fiscal capacity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 181-203, January.
    2. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Religion; Paradox of government; Governance; Buchanan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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