IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v19y2007i4p395-424.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Club Mormon

Author

Listed:
  • Michael McBride

    (Michael McBride, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA, 92697-5100, USA, mcbride@uci.edu)

Abstract

The Mormon Church is best understood as a club, in the economics sense of the term. It succeeds, in part, because it identifies and selectively rewards high contributors, thereby limiting free-riding and producing large religious benefits for its members. First, it offers a menu of club goods of varying excludability, with the most valued goods excluded from less-committed members. Second, to enforce this menu, it actively monitors its members using a sophisticated administrative structure. The menu design reflects to an extent the costs of excludability of various religious goods, and the menu-monitoring approach implicitly allows some free-riding to dynamically foster commitment. Because the menu-monitoring approach is best understood as complementing other methods in achieving the Mormon Church's religious goals, these findings yield insights into the activities of other religious groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael McBride, 2007. "Club Mormon," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(4), pages 395-424, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:4:p:395-424
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463107083736
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043463107083736
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1043463107083736?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Todd Sandler & John Tschirhart, 1997. "Club theory: Thirty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 335-355, December.
    2. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185.
    3. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
    4. Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Hebert, Robert F & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 307-331, Fall.
    5. Klick, Jonathan, 2006. "Salvation as a selective incentive," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 15-32, March.
    6. Davidson, Audrey B. & Ekelund, Robert Jr., 1997. "The medieval church and rents from marriage market regulations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-245, February.
    7. Davidson, Audrey B., 1995. "The medieval monastery as franchise monopolist," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 119-128, June.
    8. Ekelund, Robert Jr. & Hebert, Robert F. & Tollison, Robert D., 1992. "The economics of sin and redemption : Purgatory as a market-pull innovation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-15, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pedro Pita Barros & Nuno Garoupa, 2002. "An Economic Theory Of Church Strictness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 559-576, July.
    2. Anthony Gill, 2021. "The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 313-334, December.
    3. Finley, Theresa, 2021. "Free riding in the monastery: Club goods, the cistercian order and agricultural investment in Ancien Regime France," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 318-336.
    4. Koyama, Mark, 2010. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury': The usury prohibition as a barrier to entry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 420-442, October.
    5. Berggren, Niclas, 1997. "Rhetoric or reality? An economic analysis of the effects of religion in Sweden," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 571-596.
    6. Charles Zech, 2003. "Understanding denominational structures: churches as franchise organizations," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 323-335.
    7. Hollander, Gideon & Kahana, Nava & Lecker, Tikva, 2003. "Religious and secular human capital: an economic model," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 489-498, November.
    8. Mario Ferrero, 2014. "Competition between Judaism and Christianity: Paul's Galatians as Entry Deterrence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 204-226, May.
    9. Samuel Bazzi & Arya Gaduh & Alexander D. Rothenberg & Maisy Wong, 2019. "Unity in Diversity? How Intergroup Contact Can Foster Nation Building," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(11), pages 3978-4025, November.
    10. André Torre, 2002. "Les AOC sont-elles des clubs ? Réflexions sur les conditions de l'action collective localisée, entre coopération et règles formelles," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 100(1), pages 39-62.
    11. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
    12. Ennio E. Piano, 2018. "Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 350-376, August.
    13. Marek Loužek, 2007. "Ekonomie náboženství - je hypotéza sekularizace opodstatněná? [Economics of religion - is the secularization hypothesis tenable?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(5), pages 659-680.
    14. Benito Arruñada, 2003. "Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession," Economics Working Papers 653, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2009.
    15. Davidson, Audrey B. & Ekelund, Robert Jr., 1997. "The medieval church and rents from marriage market regulations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-245, February.
    16. Mario Ferrero, 2014. "Competition Between Exclusive Religions: The Counter-Reformation As Entry Deterrence," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(3), pages 280-303, July.
    17. Brandi, Clara & Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    18. Vasiliki Kostami & Dimitris Kostamis & Serhan Ziya, 2017. "Pricing and Capacity Allocation for Shared Services," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 19(2), pages 230-245, May.
    19. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2010. "The invisible hand plays dice: multiple equilibria in sects markets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 483-502, December.
    20. Heath, W. C. & Waters, M. S. & Watson, J. K., 1995. "Religion and economic welfare: An empirical analysis of state per capita income," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-142, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:4:p:395-424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.