IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/doi10.1086-671480.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Vermin Trials

Author

Listed:
  • Peter T. Leeson

Abstract

For 250 years insects and rodents accused of committing property crimes were tried as legal persons in French, Italian, and Swiss ecclesiastic courts under the same laws and according to the same procedures used to try actual persons. I argue that the Catholic Church used vermin trials to increase tithe revenues where tithe evasion threatened to erode them. Vermin trials achieved this by bolstering citizens' belief in the validity of Church punishments for tithe evasion: estrangement from God through sin, excommunication, and anathema. Vermin trials permitted ecclesiastics to evidence their supernatural sanctions' legitimacy by producing outcomes that supported those sanctions' validity. These outcomes strengthened citizens' belief that the Church's imprecations were real, which allowed ecclesiastics to reclaim jeopardized tithe revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson, 2013. "Vermin Trials," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 811-836.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/671480
    DOI: 10.1086/671480
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/671480
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/671480
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/671480?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Ekelund, Robert B, Jr & Hebert, Robert F & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 307-331, Fall.
    3. Posner, Richard A, 1980. "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cameron Harwick, 2020. "Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions: An Economic Theory of the Noble Lie," Journal of Contextual Economics (JCE) – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 140(1), pages 3-30.
    2. Peter T. Leeson & Paola A. Suarez, 2015. "Superstition and Self-Governance," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy, volume 19, pages 47-66, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    3. Franklin G. Mixon & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, 2020. "The economics of Puritanism’s treatment of bewitchment: exorcism as a potential market-pull innovation?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 203-222, October.
    4. Escalante, Edwar E. & March, Raymond J., 2020. "Fighting on Christmas: brawling as self-governance in rural Peru," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 355-368, June.
    5. Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    6. Peter T Leeson, 2014. "Oracles," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(2), pages 141-169, May.
    7. Gershman, Boris, 2015. "The economic origins of the evil eye belief," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 119-144.
    8. Leeson, Peter T. & Coyne, Christopher J., 2012. "Sassywood," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 608-620.
    9. Andrew Young, 2022. "The Peace of God," Rationality and Society, , vol. 34(1), pages 28-55, February.
    10. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2018. "Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 3-21, January.
    11. Koyama, Mark, 2016. "The long transition from a natural state to a liberal economic order," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(S), pages 29-39.
    12. Peter T. Leeson & Jacob W. Russ, 2018. "Witch Trials," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(613), pages 2066-2105, August.
    13. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "Progressive Democracy: the ideology of the modern predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 287-301, March.
    14. Clara Jace, 2019. "An economic theory of economic analysis: the case of the School of Salamanca," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 375-397, December.
    15. Anthony Gill, 2021. "The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 313-334, December.
    16. Seung Ginny Choi & Virgil Henry Storr, 2019. "A culture of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 101-126, October.
    17. Leeson, Peter T., 2020. "Logic is a harsh mistress: welfare economics for economists," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 145-150, April.
    18. Manvir Singh & Pascal Boyer & Leeson, Peter T & Mckay Ryan & Bentall, Richard P & Sarah Peacey & Ruth Mace & Schimmelpfennig, Robin & Muthukrishna, Michael, 2021. "Magic, explanations, and evil: the origins and design of witches and sorcerers," Post-Print hal-03256601, HAL.
    19. Leeson, Peter T. & Boettke, Peter J. & Lemke, Jayme S., 2014. "Wife Sales," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 349-379, December.
    20. Peter T. Leeson, 2014. ""God Damn": The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 193-216.
    21. Leeson Peter T., 2021. "Trading with the Dead," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 615-646, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter T. Leeson & Jacob W. Russ, 2018. "Witch Trials," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(613), pages 2066-2105, August.
    2. Guimaraesy, Bernardo & Meyerhof Salama, Bruno, 2017. "Contingent judicial deference: theory and application to usury laws," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86146, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Salama, Bruno Meyerhof, 2017. "Contingent judicial deference: theory and application to usury laws," Textos para discussão 440, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    4. Jared Rubin, 2009. "Social Insurance, Commitment, and the Origin of Law: Interest Bans in Early Christianity," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 761-786, November.
    5. Glaeser, Edward L & Scheinkman, Jose, 1998. "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 1-36, April.
    6. Peter T. Leeson & Jacob W. Russ, 2018. "Witch Trials," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(613), pages 2066-2105, August.
    7. Simeon Schudy & Verena Utikal, 2015. "Does imperfect data privacy stop people from collecting personal health data?," TWI Research Paper Series 98, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    8. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    9. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
    10. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    11. Nasimeh Heydaribeni & Achilleas Anastasopoulos, 2019. "Linear Equilibria for Dynamic LQG Games with Asymmetric Information and Dependent Types," Papers 1909.04834, arXiv.org.
    12. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    13. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    14. Bobkova, Nina, 2020. "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    15. He, Quqiong & Pan, Ying & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2018. "Lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior in rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 248-269.
    16. Redlicki, B., 2017. "Spreading Lies," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1747, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    17. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci & Ludovic Renou, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," Papers 2102.13562, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
    18. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    19. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    20. Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2020. "Advertising and Voter Data in Asymmetric Political Contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/671480. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.