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On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University)

  • Youngshin Kim

    (Keimyung University)

  • Alexander Marsella

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

An important issue associated with empirical research is the extent to which statistical results continue to hold in the post-sample period. Although many tests of robustness within the period of a given study are routinely reported, relatively little attention is paid to model performance in the post-sample period. This paper examines the post-sample performance of the Congleton and Shughart (Econ Inq 28(1): 109–132, 1990) estimates of three public choice models of Social Security benefit levels. The Social Security program is the single largest line item in the federal budget; so, examining the post-sample performance of the Congleton–Shughart estimates also sheds light on the long-run stability of political processes in the United States. In general, we find that the three public choice models perform well in the post-sample period, although there are several caveats to that conclusion. The results of our post-sample study also suggest that the political processes of the United States with respect to major fiscal policies are more stable and robust than news reports suggest.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton & Youngshin Kim & Alexander Marsella, 2020. "On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 101-132, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00689-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00689-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Congleton, Roger D & Shughart, William F, II, 1990. "The Growth of Social Security: Electoral Push or Political Pull?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 109-132, January.
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    2. Ludger Schuknecht & Holger Zemanek, 2021. "Public expenditures and the risk of social dominance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 95-120, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Security; Fiscal policy; Post-sample forecasts; Replication study; Public choice models; Political stability; U.S. politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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