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Rent seeking at 52: an introduction to a special issue of public choice

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  • Matthew D. Mitchell

    (Mercatus Center at George Mason University)

Abstract

A half century after he developed it, Gordon Tullock’s idea of rent seeking is more relevant than ever. Though the concept has gained widespread acceptance among academics, it has yet to make an impression on public discourse. But with favoritism, corruption, and the power of special interests in the headlines, the idea deserves broader attention. In this special issue of Public Choice we commemorate Tullock’s insight. Contributors examine the making of this classic piece and its effect on economic theory, empirical analysis, and economic teaching. Original papers also develop new insights into questions of development, the control of violence, corruption, culture, equity, regulation, rent extraction, the Political Coase Theorem, and more.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Rent seeking at 52: an introduction to a special issue of public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 1-4, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:181:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00646-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00646-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Vlad Tarko & Andrew Farrant, 2019. "The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 141-166, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "A Review of Rent-seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality, The Top 20%, 2019 by Péter Mihályi and Iván Szelényi," Working Papers hal-02290741, HAL.
    2. Alice Guerra & Tatyana Zhuravleva, 2022. "Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 173-192, April.
    3. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "A Review of Rent-seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality, The Top 20%, 2019 by Peter Mihalyi and Ivan Szelenyi," CEPN Working Papers 2019-07, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    4. Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski, 2020. "The foundations of contemporary economics: Gordon Tullock and public choice," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 107-118.
    5. Mario Menegatti, 2021. "Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 269-287, July.

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