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Do barriers to candidacy reduce political competition? Evidence from a bachelor’s degree requirement for legislators in Pakistan

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  • Madiha Afzal

Abstract

In the 2002 election, candidates for Pakistan’s federal legislature had to possess at least a bachelor’s degree. This policy disqualified 60 out of the 207 incumbent legislators from running for election again. Using a difference-in-differences approach with panel data on all electoral constituencies in Pakistan, I find that this ballot access restriction does not affect political competition across all constituencies with disqualified incumbents equally. Stronger political competition is defined as a larger number of candidates contesting election, a smaller vote share and vote margin for the winning candidate, and a less concentrated candidate field, as measured by a Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) of vote shares. Competition declined significantly in constituencies where the disqualified incumbent belonged to a small party and where literacy levels were lower (signifying a smaller pool of substitute candidates). However, political competition increased in areas where the disqualified incumbent was stronger in terms of his winning vote margin. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • Madiha Afzal, 2014. "Do barriers to candidacy reduce political competition? Evidence from a bachelor’s degree requirement for legislators in Pakistan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 51-72, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:51-72
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0126-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Chandan Jain & Shagun Kashyap & Rahul Lahoti & Soham Sahoo, 2022. "Is economic development affected by the leaders' education levels?: Evidence from India," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-68, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Chaudhry, Ahmed & Mazhar, Ummad, 2019. "Political competition and economic policy: Empirical evidence from Pakistan," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 13, pages 1-27.
    3. Das, Sabyasachi & Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop & Saroy, Rajas, 2023. "Does affirmative action in politics hinder performance? Evidence from India," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 370-405.
    4. Das, Sabyasachi & Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop & Saroy, Rajas, 2017. "Efficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics: Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 11093, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Jain, Chandan & Kashyap, Shagun & Lahoti, Rahul & Sahoo, Soham, 2023. "The impact of educated leaders on economic development: Evidence from India," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 1068-1093.
    6. Sabyasachi Das & Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay & Rajas Saroy, 2018. "Does Affirmative Action in Politics Hinder Performance? Evidence from India," Working Papers 1007, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    7. Jain, Chandan & Kashyap, Shagun & Lahoti, Rahul & Sahoo, Soham, 2022. "Do Educated Leaders Affect Economic Development? Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 15278, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Chaudhry, Ahmed & Mazhar, Ummad, 2018. "Political competition and economic performance: Empirical evidence from Pakistan," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-27, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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