Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action
AbstractIn formal analysis of collective action, usually attention is focused on problems arising in aggregating the separate orderings into coherent collective results. Our concern is not with the aggregation problem. Instead, our focus is on the particular characteristics of the alternatives themselves. Alternatives in collective actions are fundamentally different from alternatives in market choice (apples and oranges). Regardless of motivation, collectivization forces attention on the distribution of benefits and costs among others in the sharing community. We first examine the formal structure of alternatives as these are confronted by a participant in the collective action. The second feature involves distributional patterns made necessary by collectivization. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 153 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Collective action; Formal structure of alternatives; Dimensionality; Bounded rationality; Market choice; D70; D72; H40; H41;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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