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Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action


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  • J. Buchanan


  • Y. Yoon



In formal analysis of collective action, usually attention is focused on problems arising in aggregating the separate orderings into coherent collective results. Our concern is not with the aggregation problem. Instead, our focus is on the particular characteristics of the alternatives themselves. Alternatives in collective actions are fundamentally different from alternatives in market choice (apples and oranges). Regardless of motivation, collectivization forces attention on the distribution of benefits and costs among others in the sharing community. We first examine the formal structure of alternatives as these are confronted by a participant in the collective action. The second feature involves distributional patterns made necessary by collectivization. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 153 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 9-16

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:9-16

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Related research

Keywords: Collective action; Formal structure of alternatives; Dimensionality; Bounded rationality; Market choice; D70; D72; H40; H41;

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  1. James Buchanan & Yong Yoon, 2006. "All voting is strategic," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 159-167, October.
  2. Flowers, Marilyn R. & Danzon, Patricia M., 1984. "Separation of the redistributive and allocative functions of government : A public choice perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 373-380, August.
  3. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 334.
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Cited by:
  1. Rustam Romaniuc, 2012. "Judicial Dissent under Externalities and Incomplete Information," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 209-224, October.


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