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The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism

Author

Listed:
  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Gerrit B. Koester

Abstract

We review the claim that the field of political economy has witnessed a quantum leap with Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini´s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. We find that the approach of Persson and Tabellini suffers from the neglect of previous research, notably in public choice tradition, a lack of a meaningful point of reference, and the disregard of individual liberty as a guiding principle. Their approach has only limited value for formulating, exploring, and judging institutional reforms, particularly reforms outside narrow bounds around the status quo of the liberal democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles B. Blankart & Gerrit B. Koester, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 4(2), pages 169-183, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:4:y:2007:i:2:p:169-183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles B. Blankart & Gerrit B. Koester, 2006. "Political Economics versus Public Choice," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 171-200, May.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Reply to Blankart and Koester's Political Economics versus Public Choice Two Views of Political Economy in Competition," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 201-208, May.
    4. Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 69-105, March.
    5. Pommerehne, Werner W & Frey, Bruno S, 1978. "Bureaucratic Behavior in Democracy: A Case Study," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 33(1-2), pages 98-112.
    6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
    7. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1998. "Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 685-694, May.
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    11. Dan Johansson, 2004. "Economics Without Entrepreneurship or Institutions: A Vocabulary Analysis of Graduate Textbooks," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(3), pages 515-538, December.
    12. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    13. Charles B. Blankart & Dennis C. Mueller, 2002. "Alternativen der parlamentarischen Demokratie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, February.
    14. Ashenfelter, Orley C & Kelley, Stanley, Jr, 1975. "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 695-733, December.
    15. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    16. Charles Blankart & Dennis Mueller, 2004. "The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 431-453, February.
    17. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, October.
    18. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 334-334.
    19. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Positive political economy; constitutional political economy; constitutional choice; general economic theory; public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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