Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism

Contents:

Author Info

  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Gerrit B. Koester

Abstract

We review the claim that the field of political economy has witnessed a quantum leap with Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini´s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. We find that the approach of Persson and Tabellini suffers from the neglect of previous research, notably in public choice tradition, a lack of a meaningful point of reference, and the disregard of individual liberty as a guiding principle. Their approach has only limited value for formulating, exploring, and judging institutional reforms, particularly reforms outside narrow bounds around the status quo of the liberal democracies.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econjwatch.org/file_download/145/2007-05-blankartkoester-sympos.pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://econjwatch.org/237
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econ Journal Watch in its journal Econ Journal Watch.

Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 169-183

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:4:y:2007:i:2:p:169-183

Contact details of provider:
Postal: MSN 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030
Phone: (703) 993-1151
Fax: 703.993.1133
Web page: http://econjwatch.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Positive political economy; constitutional political economy; constitutional choice; general economic theory; public choice;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:4:y:2007:i:2:p:169-183. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jason Briggeman) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Jason Briggeman to update the entry or send us the correct address.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.