The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism
AbstractWe review the claim that the field of political economy has witnessed a quantum leap with Torsten Persson and Guido TabelliniÂ´s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. We find that the approach of Persson and Tabellini suffers from the neglect of previous research, notably in public choice tradition, a lack of a meaningful point of reference, and the disregard of individual liberty as a guiding principle. Their approach has only limited value for formulating, exploring, and judging institutional reforms, particularly reforms outside narrow bounds around the status quo of the liberal democracies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econ Journal Watch in its journal Econ Journal Watch.
Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Positive political economy; constitutional political economy; constitutional choice; general economic theory; public choice;
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