IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v124y2005i3p365-382.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property: A diagrammatic exposition

Author

Listed:
  • Donald Wittman

Abstract

Voters value valence characteristics such as honesty and competence. In this paper, we consider the situation where candidates may have more than one valence characteristic of importance to the voters. At the same time we introduce a new concept “the median-crossing property" which differs from single-peakedness and is less restrictive than the single-crossing property. If indifference curves satisfy the median-crossing property, then voting is transitive and the majority's preference rankings coincide with those of the median voter; if the indifference curves violate the median-crossing property, then intransitivity may arise. The framework also allows us to consider elections with costly policy. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Wittman, 2005. "Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property: A diagrammatic exposition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 365-382, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:365-382
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2053-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-2053-3
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-005-2053-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Limitations of the spatial model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 161-167, August.
    2. Andrea Prat, 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 999-1017.
    3. Coughlin, Peter J. & Hinich, Melvin J., 1984. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for single-peakedness in public economic models," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 161-179, November.
    4. Rothstein, Paul, 1991. "Representative Voter Theorems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 193-212, December.
    5. Wittman, Donald, 2007. "Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 360-378, June.
    6. Stokes, Donald E., 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 368-377, June.
    7. Sigelman, Lee & Wahlbeck, Paul J., 1997. "The “Veepstakes†: Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate Selection," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(4), pages 855-864, December.
    8. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    9. Milyo, Jeffrey, 2000. "Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models: A Constructive Critique," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 273-289, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wittman, Donald, 2007. "Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 360-378, June.
    2. Germà Bel & Antonio Miralles, 2010. "Choosing between Service Fees and Budget Funding to Pay for Local Services: Empirical Evidence from Spain," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 28(1), pages 54-71, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael K Miller, 2011. "Seizing the mantle of change: Modeling candidate quality as effectiveness instead of valence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 52-68, January.
    2. Martínez-Mora, Francisco & Puy, M. Socorro, 2014. "The determinants and electoral consequences of asymmetric preferences," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 85-97.
    3. Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006. "Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 211-223, April.
    4. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias, 2010. "Competition between Specialized Candidates," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 745-765, November.
    5. John Duggan, 2016. "Preference exclusions for social rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 93-118, January.
    6. Fan-chin Kung, 2005. "Formation of Collective Decision-Making Units: Stability and a Solution," Game Theory and Information 0505002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jun 2005.
    7. Nicolas Motz, 2019. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(1), pages 161-196, January.
    8. Clemens Puppe & Arkadii Slinko, 2019. "Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(1), pages 285-318, February.
    9. Meirowitz, Adam, 2006. "Electoral Contests," Papers 06-21-2007, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    10. Puppe, Clemens, 2018. "The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 55-80.
    11. ,, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
    12. Martínez-Mora Francisco & Puy M. Socorro, 2012. "Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, December.
    13. Fabian Gouret & Stéphane Rossignol, 2019. "Intensity valence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 63-112, June.
    14. Simone Righi, 2015. "Campaign Spending and Rents in a Probabilistic Voting Model," Department of Economics 0073, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    15. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2008. "Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 215-239, July.
    16. M Socorro Puy, 2019. "Incentives for progressive income taxation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 66-102, January.
    17. Murat C. Mungan, 2017. "Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 377-395, September.
    18. David Soberman & Loïc Sadoulet, 2007. "Campaign Spending Limits and Political Advertising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1521-1532, October.
    19. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2016. "The political economy of (De)centralization with complementary public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 315-348, August.
    20. Slinko, Arkadii & Wu, Qinggong & Wu, Xingye, 2021. "A characterization of preference domains that are single-crossing and maximal Condorcet," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:365-382. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.