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Limitations of the spatial model

Author

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  • Amihai Glazer
  • Bernard Grofman

Abstract

One approach to avoiding the implications of Arrow's paradox is to impose restrictions on the preferences of voters. A restriction often assumed in the literature is that voters' preferences can be represented by a choice among points in a space, where voters' preferences are convex. We claim that these assumptions will often be unjustified. Government must often address issues of externalities or public goods, which means that the possibility frontier will not be concave. This in turn means that voters' preferences over feasible policies will not be convex. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Limitations of the spatial model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 161-167, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:58:y:1988:i:2:p:161-167
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00125720
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    3. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    5. Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 1985. "The politics of flatland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 45-60, January.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donald Wittman, 2005. "Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property: A diagrammatic exposition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 365-382, September.

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