Representative Voter Theorems
AbstractThe representative voter is an individual whose strict preference for any alternative x over any alternative y implies (1) x strictly defeats y by majority rule, if there are an odd number of voters, and (2) x weakly defeats y otherwise. This result holds for the median voter if x is his ideal point or if preferences satisfy a generalized symmetry property, but not in general. The authors examine a formal condition that guarantees the existence of a representative voter and an economic model in which this condition holds. They also indicate a method for estimating representative voting behavior that is justified when a representative voter exists, and compare this with a method for deriving median voting behavior from an estimated demand curve. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 72 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (December)
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- Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006.
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