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Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter

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Author Info
Marco Bassetto
Jess Benhabib

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Abstract

We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the “bang- bang” property.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Working Paper Series with number WP-06-02.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-06-02

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Keywords: Taxation Wealth

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Adam Przeworski & Jess Benhabib, 2004. "The Political Economy of Redistribution under Democracy," 2004 Meeting Papers 58, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," 2004 Meeting Papers 466, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andrew Atkeson & V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Taxing capital income: a bad idea," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-17. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Chamley, Christophe, 1985. "Efficient Taxation in a Stylized Model of Intertemporal General Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(2), pages 451-68, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rothstein, Paul, 1991. " Representative Voter Theorems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 193-212, December.
  9. Pollak, Robert A, 1971. "Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(116), pages 401-14, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bassetto, Marco, 2005. "Equilibrium and government commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 79-105, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kenneth L. Judd, 1982. "Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model," Discussion Papers 572, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1997. "Optimal Taxes without Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 231-259, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 59-83, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marina Azzimonti-Renzo & Eva de Francisco & Per Krusell, 2006. "The political economy of labor subsidies," Working Paper 06-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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