Non-binding linked-issues referenda: Analysis and an application
AbstractNon-binding referenda (‘petitions') are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle. This paper provides a simple theoretical and empirical analysis of a particular form of non-binding referenda, so-called linked-issues petitions. It analyzes the ability of issue linkage to increase participation levels above those of single-issue petitions and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in Austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and Eastern enlargement of the European Union. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 124 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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