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Partisan stabilization policy and voter control

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  • David Kiefer

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    Abstract

    Abstract. Representative democracy is a principal-agent institution. Voter influence over macroeconomic policy should be noticeable during election years when the president (agent) and median voter (principal) disagree about goals. They might disagree due to the prospective benefit of choosing a policymaker who is more conservative than the voter. This conclusion is demonstrated analytically in a new Keynesian model of endogenous stabilization in which the president reacts quickly to lean against the macroeconomic wind. We support the principalagent characterization of voters and presidents in an endogenous policy model with regression estimates of growth rate targets, allowing for differences between Democrats and Republicans. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-3991-5
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 122 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 115-132

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:122:y:2005:i:1:p:115-132

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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    1. Waller, Christopher J, 1992. "The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-12, September.
    2. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1983. "Presidential Popularity and Macroeconomic Performance: Are Voters Really So Naive?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 385-92, August.
    4. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    5. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    7. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
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    Cited by:
    1. David Kiefer, 2008. "New Keynesian Endogenous Stabilization in a Panel of Countries," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2008_19, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    2. David Kiefer, 2006. "Endogenous Stabilization in Open Democracies," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2006_01, University of Utah, Department of Economics.

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