Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Revealed Preferences for Macroeconomic Stabilization

Contents:

Author Info

  • David Kiefer
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    In the new Keynesian model of endogenous stabilization governments have objectives with respect to macroeconomic performance, but are constrained by an augmented Phillips curve. Because they react more quickly to inflation shocks than private agents, governments can lean against the macroeconomic wind. We develop an econometric test of this characterization of the political-economic equilibrium. Applying this methodology to a variety of quadratic social welfare functions provides inferences about the functional form of stabilization preferences and about the formation of expectations.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://economics.utah.edu/publications/2005_03.pdf
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify ()
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Utah, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah with number 2005_03.

    as in new window
    Length: 27 pages
    Date of creation: 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2005_03

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 1645 E. Central Campus Dr. Front, Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9300
    Phone: (801) 581-7481
    Fax: (801) 585-5649
    Web page: http://economics.utah.edu
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Stabilization; Philips curve; public policy;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1983. "Presidential Popularity and Macroeconomic Performance: Are Voters Really So Naive?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 385-92, August.
    3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    4. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
    5. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-83, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2005_03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.