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Interlocking directorship across Italian listed companies: evidence from a natural experiment

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  • Lucrezia Fattobene

    (Polytechnic University of Marche
    Polytechnic University of Marche)

  • Marco Caiffa

    (Deloitte Financial Advisory)

  • Emiliano Di Carlo

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata”)

Abstract

The financial crisis of 2008 and the introduction of the Interlocking Ban in 2011 (for financial firms) deeply influenced the Italian corporate governance system. The aim of the present study is to investigate to what extent personal ties among the directors of Italian listed companies have changed after these two events. We describe the evolution and dimension of the phenomenon of interlocking directorship (ID) for all the Italian listed companies over the period 1998–2013 using different methodologies. Social network analysis discloses the existence of clusters of companies whose links remain dense after the crisis, while connections to the peripheral units of the system decrease, reducing the overall connectedness. Results reveal that, over the period, there is a reduction in the cumulation ratio which still remains high and mainly due to a high number of directorships for multiple directors. This reduction is more severe after 2008 when both the financial crisis and the Interlocking Ban occur. In disentangling the two effects we observe ID reduction during and after the crisis, also for non-financial firms, confirming the general tendency of a decline in national board interlocking networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucrezia Fattobene & Marco Caiffa & Emiliano Di Carlo, 2018. "Interlocking directorship across Italian listed companies: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 393-425, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:22:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10997-017-9392-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-017-9392-6
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