IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jfsres/v63y2023i3d10.1007_s10693-021-00376-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Norvald Instefjord

    (University of Essex)

  • Hiroyuki Nakata

    (University of Tokyo Research Institute of Economy)

Abstract

We evaluate the value of loan monitoring systems for a bank controlled by a micro-prudential regulator. We investigate dynamic systems (an information channel that generates information flow about quality) and static systems (where the lender receives a single signal about loan quality). We find that dynamic systems carry a regulatory charge that dominates the benefit of the systems and are therefore unprofitable, whereas static systems have positive value. Specifically, lenders can profitably dismantle their dynamic systems and instead turn to static monitoring systems. The model reveals, therefore, a potential weakness of micro-prudential regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Norvald Instefjord & Hiroyuki Nakata, 2023. "Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 339-362, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:63:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10693-021-00376-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10693-021-00376-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10693-021-00376-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10693-021-00376-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/14127 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Pennacchi, George G, 1988. " Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-396, June.
    3. Loretta J. Mester & Leonard I. Nakamura & Micheline Renault, 1998. "Checking accounts and bank monitoring," Working Papers 98-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Morrison, Alan & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2009. "Internal Reporting Systems, Compensation Contracts and Bank Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Ebrahimi Kahou, Mahdi & Lehar, Alfred, 2017. "Macroprudential policy: A review," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 92-105.
    6. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    8. Berger, Allen N. & Miller, Nathan H. & Petersen, Mitchell A. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Stein, Jeremy C., 2005. "Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 237-269, May.
    9. Thijssen, Jacco J.J., 2008. "Optimal and strategic timing of mergers and acquisitions motivated by synergies and risk diversification," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1701-1720, May.
    10. Ho-Mou Wu & Yue Zhao, 2016. "Optimal Leverage Ratio and Capital Requirements with Limited Regulatory Power," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2125-2150.
    11. Morrison, Alan & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2009. "Internal Reporting Systems, Compensation Contracts, and Bank Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, June.
    13. Gilles Chemla & Christopher A. Hennessy, 2014. "Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(4), pages 1597-1641, August.
    14. Dai, Min & Kwok, Yue Kuen & You, Hong, 2007. "Intensity-based framework and penalty formulation of optimal stopping problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3860-3880, December.
    15. El Karoui, Nicole & Jeanblanc, Monique & Lacoste, Vincent, 2005. "Optimal portfolio management with American capital guarantee," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 449-468, March.
    16. Gilles Chemla & Christopher A. Hennessy, 2014. "Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard," Post-Print hal-01457063, HAL.
    17. Christine Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Post-Print hal-03415832, HAL.
    18. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
    19. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anatoli Segura & Alonso Villacorta, 2020. "Demand for safety, risky loans: A model of securitization," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1260, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Segura, Anatoli & Zeng, Jing, 2020. "Off-balance sheet funding, voluntary support and investment efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 90-107.
    3. Matthew J. Botsch, 2022. "Public and Private Benefits of Information in Markets for Securitized Assets," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 319-365, June.
    4. Ahnert, Toni & Kuncl, Martin, 2022. "Government loan guarantees, market liquidity, and lending standards," Working Paper Series 2710, European Central Bank.
    5. Norvald INSTEFJORD & NAKATA Hiroyuki, 2015. "Loan Monitoring and Bank Risk," Discussion papers 15121, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    6. Albanesi, Stefania & DeGiorgi, Giacomo & Nosal, Jaromir, 2022. "Credit growth and the financial crisis: A new narrative," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 118-139.
    7. Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1164, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Jang, Inkee & Kang, Kee-Youn, 2021. "Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    9. Chiesa, Gabriella, 2008. "Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 464-477, October.
    10. Kuong, John Chi-Fong & Zeng, Jing, 2021. "Securitization and optimal foreclosure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    11. Spiros Bougheas, 2014. "Pooling, tranching, and credit expansion," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 557-579.
    12. van der Plaat, Mark & Spierdijk, Laura, 2020. "Recourse, asymmetric information, and credit risk over the business cycle," MPRA Paper 104718, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    14. Goenner, Cullen F, 2016. "The policy impact of new rules for loan participation on credit union returns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 198-210.
    15. Veronica Rappoport & Philipp Schnabl & Daniel Paravisini, 2015. "Comparative Advantage and Specialization in Bank Lending," 2015 Meeting Papers 499, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Yuliya Demyanyk & Charlotte Ostergaard & Bent E. Sørensen, 2007. "U.S. Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses, and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(6), pages 2763-2801, December.
    17. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2020. "Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 1037-1082, April.
    18. Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.
    19. Paravisini, Daniel & Rappoport, Veronica & Schnabl, Philipp, 2023. "Specialization in bank lending: evidence from exporting firms," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119458, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Marco Migliorelli & Philippe Dessertine, 2017. "Time for new financing instruments? A market-oriented framework to finance environmentally friendly practices in EU agriculture," Post-Print halshs-02103991, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit scoring; Dynamic monitoring; Loan risk; Loan sales; Optimal stopping; Static monitoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:63:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10693-021-00376-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.