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Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management

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Author Info
Saltuk Ozerturk
Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/B:FINA.0000008663.41246.2c
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

Volume (Year): 25 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 25-36
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:25-36

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Delegated portfolio management; linear compensation; information acquisition; noisy rational expectations equilibrium.;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eitan Goldman & Steve L. Slezak, 2003. "Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 283-311, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Huberman, Gur & Kandel, Shmuel, 1993. "On the incentives for money managers : A signalling approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1065-1081, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bruno Biais & Laurent Germain, 2002. "Incentive-Compatible Contracts for the Sale of Information," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 987-1003.
  4. Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2000. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2311-2331, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, . "Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 21-88, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Godbillon-Camus, Brigitte & Godlewski, Christophe, 2005. "Credit risk management in banks: Hard information, soft Information and manipulation," MPRA Paper 1873, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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