On the Incentives for Money Nanagers: A Signalling Approach

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On the Incentives for Money Nanagers: A Signalling Approach

Author Info

Huberman, G.
Kandel, S.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Gur Huberman

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Columbia - Graduate School of Business in its series Papers with number 92-16.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:colubu:92-16

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Postal: U.S.A.; COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, PAINE WEBBER , New York, NY 10027 U.S.A
Phone: (212) 854-5553
Web page: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/business/
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Related research
Keywords: stock market ; risk;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Huberman, Gur & Kandel, Shmuel, 1993. "On the incentives for money managers : A signalling approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1065-1081, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Connie Becker & Wayne Ferson & David Myers & Michael Schill, 1998. "Conditional Market Timing with Benchmark Investors," NBER Working Papers 6434, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ping Hu & Jayant Kale & Ajay Subramanian, 2003. "Compensation, Career Concerns, and Relative Risk Choices by Mutual Fund Managers: Theory and Evidence," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000349, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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