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Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts

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Author Info
Mark Grinblatt
Sheridan Titman

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Abstract

In this paper, option pricing theory is used to value and analyze many performance-based fee contracts that are currently in use. A potential problem with some of these contracts is that they may induce portfolio managers to adversely alter the risk of the portfolio they manage. This paper is prescriptive, in that it derives conditions for contract parameters that provide proper risk incentives for classes of investment strategies. For buy-and-hold and rebalancing strategies, adverse risk incentives are avoided when the penalties for poor performance outweigh the rewards for good performance.

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Paper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number 21-88.

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Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:21-88

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  1. Javier Gil-Bazo, 2001. "Portfolio Management Fees: Assets Or Profits Based Compensation?," Business Economics Working Papers wb012207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0503, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Han, Bing & Wang, Winghai, 2005. "Institutional Investment Constraints and Stock Prices," Working Paper Series 2004-24, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gehrig, Thomas P. & Lütje, Torben & Menkhoff, Lukas, 2008. "Bonus Payments and Fund Managers' Behavior: Trans-Atlantic Evidence," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-411, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Juan-Pedro Gómez & Tridib Sharma, 2003. "Portfolio Delegation under Short-selling Constraints," Economics Working Papers 695, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Ching-mann Huang & Len-kuo Hu & Hsin-Hong Kang, 2005. "Compensation Design and Career Concerns of Fund Manager," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 379-397, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Juan Pedro Gomez, 2007. "The impact of benchmarking and portfolio constraints on a fund manager´s market timing ability," Working Papers Economia wp07-02, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment. [Downloadable!]
  9. Francisca G.-C. Richter, B. Wade Brorsen, 2000. "Estimating fees for managed futures: a continuous-time model with a knockout feature," Applied Mathematical Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 115-125, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1998. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," NBER Working Papers 6394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Ping Hu & Jayant Kale & Ajay Subramanian, 2003. "Compensation, Career Concerns, and Relative Risk Choices by Mutual Fund Managers: Theory and Evidence," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000349, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Athanasios Orphanides, 1996. "Compensation incentives and risk taking behavior: evidence from mutual funds," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  13. Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, 1996. "The Impact of Performance-Based Fees on Pension Fund Management," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1201, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Javier Gil-Bazo & Miguel Angel Martinez, 2004. "The Black Box of Mutual Fund Fees," DFAEII Working Papers 200401, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II. [Downloadable!]
  15. Palomino, Frédéric & Prat, Andrea, 1999. "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Uday Rajan & Sanjay Srivastava, 2000. "Portfolio Delegation with Limited Liability," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1503, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Jennifer Koski & Jeffrey Pontiff, 1996. "How Are Derivatives Used? Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-27, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Pegaret Pichler, 2004. "Optimal Contracts for Teams of Money Managers," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 495, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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