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Credit risk management in banks: Hard information, soft Information and manipulation

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  • Godbillon-Camus, Brigitte
  • Godlewski, Christophe

Abstract

The role of information’s processing in bank intermediation is a crucial input. The bank has access to different types of information in order to manage risk through capital allocation for Value at Risk coverage. Hard information, contained in balance sheet data and produced with credit scoring, is quantitative and verifiable. Soft information, produced within a bank relationship, is qualitative and non verifiable, therefore manipulable, but produces more precise estimation of the debtor’s quality. In this article, we investigate the impact of the information’s type on credit risk management in a principalagent framework with moral hazard with hidden information. The results show that access to soft information allows the banker to decrease the capital allocation for VaR coverage. We also show the existence of an incentive of the credit officer to manipulate the signal based on soft information that he produces. Therefore, we propose to implement an adequate incentive salary package which unables this manipulation. The comparison of the results from the two frameworks (information hard versus combination of hard and soft information) using simulations confirms that soft information gives an advantage to the banker but requires particular organizational modifications within the bank, as it allows to reduce capital allocation for VaR coverage.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1873.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1873

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Related research

Keywords: Hard information; Soft information; risk management; Value at Risk; moral hazard; hidden information; manipulation;

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References

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  1. Brigitte Godbillon-Camus & Christophe J. Godlewski, 2005. "Gestion du Risque de Crédit dans la Banque : Information Hard, Information Soft et Manipulation," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2005-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  2. Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Udell, Gregory F., 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 2127-2167, December.
  3. Jonathan Scott, 2004. "Small Business and the Value of Community Financial Institutions," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 207-230, April.
  4. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
  5. Loretta J. Mester, 1997. "What's the point of credit scoring?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Sep, pages 3-16.
  6. J�n Dan�elsson & Bj�rn N. Jorgensen & Casper G. de Vries, 2001. "Incentives for Effective Risk Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-094/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Grunert, Jens & Norden, Lars & Weber, Martin, 2005. "The role of non-financial factors in internal credit ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 509-531, February.
  8. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1996. " The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1139-74, September.
  9. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F32-F53, February.
  10. Bernardo, Antonio E. & Cai, Hongbin & Luo, Jiang, 2001. "Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 311-344, September.
  11. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
  12. Hakenes, Hendrik, 2003. "Banks as Delegated Risk Managers," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-13, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  13. Elsas, Ralf, 2005. "Empirical determinants of relationship lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-57, January.
  14. Frame, W Scott & Srinivasan, Aruna & Woosley, Lynn, 2001. "The Effect of Credit Scoring on Small-Business Lending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 813-25, August.
  15. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Precise Information in Delegated Portfolio Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Degryse, H.A. & Cerqueiro, G.M. & Ongena, S., 2007. "Distance, Bank Organizational Structure and Credit," Discussion Paper 2007-018, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  2. Geraldo Cerqueiro & Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2007. "Rules versus Discretion in Loan Rate Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 2091, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Herve Alexandre & Aymen Smondel, 2010. "Substitution or complementarity between Information “soft” and information “hard”: why and which effect on bank profitability?," Post-Print halshs-00538326, HAL.
  4. Henselmann, Klaus & Scherr, Elisabeth, 2012. "Content analysis of XBRL filings as an efficient supplement of bankruptcy prediction? Empirical evidence based on US GAAP annual reports," Working Papers in Accounting Valuation Auditing 2012-2, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lehrstuhl für Rechnungswesen und Prüfungswesen.

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