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Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

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Author Info
Bernardo, Antonio E.
Cai, Hongbin
Luo, Jiang

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 61 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 311-344
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:61:y:2001:i:3:p:311-344

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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  1. Godbillon-Camus, Brigitte & Godlewski, Christophe, 2005. "Credit risk management in banks: Hard information, soft Information and manipulation," MPRA Paper 1873, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stoughton, Neal & Zechner, Josef, 2004. "Optimal Capital Allocation Using RAROC(tm) and EVA," CEPR Discussion Papers 4169, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Michael Kuhn, . "Delegating Budgets when Agents Care About Autonomy," Discussion Papers 04/10, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Steven R. Grenadier & Neng Wang, 2005. "Investment Timing, Agency, and Information," NBER Working Papers 11148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. repec:dgr:uvatin:20020059 is not listed on IDEAS
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