Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.
Volume (Year): 63 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
optimal control; dynamics of the firm; pollution control; history-dependent equilibria; capital accumulation; L51; Q20; D10;
Other versions of this item:
- Hartl, R.F. & Kort, P.M., 1995. "Capital Accumulation of a Firm Facing an Emissions Tax," Papers 9578, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Hartl, R.F. & Kort, P.M., 1995. "Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax," Discussion Paper 1995-78, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Kort, P.M. & Loon, P.M.J.J. van & Luptacik, M., 1990. "Optimal dynamic environmental policies of a profit maximizing firm," Research Memorandum 433, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
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- Feenstra, T.L. & Kort, P.M. & Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1997. "Environmental Policy in an International Duopoly: An Analysis of Feedback Investment Strategies," Discussion Paper 1997-43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sunderasan Srinivasan & Raj Singh, 2010. "The persistence of green goodwill," Environment, Development and Sustainability, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 825-837, October.
- Tommy Lundgren, 2003. "A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(1), pages 17-31, May.
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