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Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability

Author

Listed:
  • Williams Huamani

    (Federal University of Latin American Integration)

  • Marcelo José Braga

    (Federal University of Viçosa)

  • Lucas Campio Pinha

    (Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro)

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of antitrust enforcement on the stability of the quantity-setting cartel at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We derive an incentive compatibility constraint that allows us to examine the effect of antitrust enforcement on cartel stability at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We verified that both the antitrust enforcement and the degree of product differentiation affect cartel stability. We found that the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and cartel stability is increasing—if the products are more homogeneous, the cartel is less stable. Next, we prove that antitrust enforcement is more efficient (that is, its impacts more intense) in destabilizing the cartel if its products are highly differentiated, i.e., the cartel under antitrust enforcement is more stable when its products tend to be homogeneous.

Suggested Citation

  • Williams Huamani & Marcelo José Braga & Lucas Campio Pinha, 2024. "Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 275-287, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:141:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-023-00851-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Degree of product differentiation; Quantity-setting; Antitrust enforcement; Cartel stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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