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Propulsions Toward What Capes? Testing Normative Theory Through a Panorama of Consequences

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  • Ryan Krause

    (Texas Christian University)

  • Michael C. Withers

    (Texas A&M University)

Abstract

Many management theories have descriptive and normative elements, and no management theory used to generate prescriptions can be totally devoid of normative assumptions. Yet, there remain few useful models for assessing the relative strength or utility of the normative frameworks that inform most management theorizing. In this essay, we offer a model from a field of art rather than science. We introduce the poetry of early twentieth century American writer Hart Crane as providing such a model. Crane uses a panorama of consequences to examine modern social phenomena and subject them to normative evaluation. We argue that management theorists can use a similar panorama of consequences method to “test” normative theories by assessing the directional consistency of the normative evaluations the theories generate about an empirical phenomenon or relationship, as well as how extensively the theories’ normative evaluations cover the full scope of a phenomenon’s or relationship’s impact. We explicate an exemplar poem of Crane’s, and then demonstrate how his method might be used to study shareholder activism, a normatively ambiguous management practice, in a way that illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant normative frameworks.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan Krause & Michael C. Withers, 2022. "Propulsions Toward What Capes? Testing Normative Theory Through a Panorama of Consequences," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(2), pages 317-333, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:181:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10551-021-04982-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-021-04982-2
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