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Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction

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  • Thomas, Randall S.
  • Cotter, James F.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFK-4NFXG83-1/2/943fee56ee4280f839f27b6eebb44c2a
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Corporate Finance.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 2-3 (June)
    Pages: 368-391

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:13:y:2007:i:2-3:p:368-391

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Kose John & April Klein, 1995. "Shareholder Proposals and Corporate Governance," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-046, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    2. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    3. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
    4. Bizjak, John M. & Marquette, Christopher J., 1998. "Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 499-521, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Chen, Dong, 2012. "Classified boards, the cost of debt, and firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3346-3365.
    2. Chris Mallin & Andrea Melis, 2012. "Shareholder rights, shareholder voting, and corporate performance," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 171-176, May.
    3. Boylan, Robert & Cebula, Richard & Foley, Maggie & Liu, Xiaowei, 2013. "An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals," MPRA Paper 56659, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Cziraki, P. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective," Discussion Paper 2009-019, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    5. McCahery, J.A. & Sautner, Z., 2012. "Institutional Investor Preferences and Executive Compensation (Revision of 2011-103)," Discussion Paper 2012-004, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Cai, Jay & Garner, Jacqueline L. & Walkling, Ralph A., 2013. "A paper tiger? An empirical analysis of majority voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 119-135.
    7. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, 2009. "Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation," NBER Working Papers 15449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ding, Rong & Hou, Wenxuan & Kuo, Jing-Ming & Lee, Edward, 2013. "Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 166-185.
    9. Becker-Blease, John R., 2011. "Governance and innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 947-958, September.
    10. Hadani, Michael & Goranova, Maria & Khan, Raihan, 2011. "Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(12), pages 1352-1360.
    11. Vicente Cunat & Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, 2010. "The Vote is cast: The effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value," FMG Discussion Papers dp663, Financial Markets Group.
    12. Samuel Mansell, 2013. "Shareholder Theory and Kant’s ‘Duty of Beneficence’," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 117(3), pages 583-599, October.
    13. Jean-Sebastien Lantz & Sophie Montandrau & Jean-Michel Sahut, 2014. "Activism of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Alerts and Financial Performance," Working Papers 2014-353, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    14. Del Guercio, Diane & Seery, Laura & Woidtke, Tracie, 2008. "Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists "just vote no"?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-103, October.
    15. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, 2007. "Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2660, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2008.
    16. Morgan, Angela & Poulsen, Annette & Wolf, Jack & Yang, Tina, 2011. "Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 914-928, September.
    17. Renneboog, Luc & Szilagyi, Peter G., 2011. "The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 167-188, February.
    18. repec:eme:mfipps:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:456-484 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Smith, Janet Kiholm, 2007. "Evaluating the boundaries of SEC regulation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 189-194, June.
    20. Guo, Re-Jin & Kruse, Timothy A. & Nohel, Tom, 2008. "Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 274-288, June.
    21. McCahery, J.A. & Sautner, Z., 2011. "Institutional Investor Preferences and Executive Compensation (replaced by CentER DP 2012-004)," Discussion Paper 2011-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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