Investor activism and takeovers
AbstractRecent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent. Firms targeted by activists are more likely than control firms to get acquired. Finally, activist investors' portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover interest declined.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.
Volume (Year): 92 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576
Investor activism Event studies Hedge funds Corporate control;
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