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Consequentialist Motives for Punishment Signal Trustworthiness

Author

Listed:
  • Nathan A. Dhaliwal

    (UBC Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia)

  • Daniel P. Skarlicki

    (UBC Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia)

  • JoAndrea Hoegg

    (UBC Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia)

  • Michael A. Daniels

    (UBC Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia)

Abstract

Upholding cooperative norms via punishment is of central importance in organizations. But what effect does punishing have on the reputation of the punisher? Although previous research shows third parties can garner reputational benefits for punishing transgressors who violate social norms, we proposed that such reputational benefits can vary based on the perceived motive for the punishment. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing were seen as more trustworthy. In Study 3, the results showed that when pitted against one another, a person who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing was chosen more often as a partner in a Trust Game. In Study 4, we found that a manager who expressed a consequentialist reason for punishing an employee was seen as having less psychopathic tendencies, and this related to the manager being perceived as more trustworthy and a superior cooperation partner. Using a recall methodology, Study 5 results showed that employees who perceived their managers as having more consequentialist (versus deontological) motives for punishing also perceived their managers as being less psychopathic and more trustworthy. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan A. Dhaliwal & Daniel P. Skarlicki & JoAndrea Hoegg & Michael A. Daniels, 2022. "Consequentialist Motives for Punishment Signal Trustworthiness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 451-466, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:176:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-020-04664-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-020-04664-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Punishment; Deontology; Trust;
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