Factor mobility, government debt and the decline in public investment
Abstract
This paper tries to explain the declining level of public investment in OECD countries. The theoretical framework hints to the relevance of a number of demand and supply factors â ranging from the yield of public investment to institutions like the EU deficit limits. The econometric results indicate that the decline is largely due to two developments: First to the pile-up of public debt since the 70s which in the 90s severely restricted ability to finance new investment. Second to the increasing mobility of factors that has added to the financing difficulties. In contrast to that neither the privatisation process nor EU deficit restrictions of the Maastricht Treaty can explain the decline. --(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Economics and Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 3 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 11-26
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=111059
Related research
Keywords: Public investment; Factor mobility; Globalisation; Public debt; OECD; EU; H50; H63; H87;Other versions of this item:
- Heinemann, Friedrich, 2002. "Factor Mobility, Government Debt and the Decline in Public Investment," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-19, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Kellermann, Kersten, 2007. "Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of "the golden rule of public sector borrowing"," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1088-1104, December.
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