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Determining a Modified Currency Board's Two-Period Exchange Rate Strategy

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  • Ying Wu

Abstract

Is it preferable for a modified currency board (MCB) to disguise its true characteristics and preferences and renege later? This paper analyzes a model in which a MCB determines its first-period exchange rate strategy to maximize a two-period welfare function. The inflation rate anchored by a classical currency board (CCB) is always a benchmark to the MCB in its first period decision. If the benchmark inflation rate is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high, the MCB chooses the optimal exchange rate in both periods without playing a credibility game over time. However, if the benchmark is at a moderate level, a strategy of overtly deceiving the public by pretending to be a CCB is shown to be superior to a strategy of concealing through policy randomization. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2005

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  • Ying Wu, 2005. "Determining a Modified Currency Board's Two-Period Exchange Rate Strategy," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 11(4), pages 347-357, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:11:y:2005:i:4:p:347-357:10.1007/s11294-005-2273-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11294-005-2273-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    E42; F32; F41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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