How do Markets Manage Water Resources? An Experiment
AbstractWe experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 53 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
Resource overexploitation; Public utility; Private monopoly; Duopoly; Water quality; Experiments;
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- Noussair, C.N. & Soest, D.P. van, 2014. "Economic Experiments and Environmental Policy: A Review," Discussion Paper 2014-001, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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