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Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

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Author Info
Hua Wang
Nlandu Mamingi
Benoit Laplante
Susmita Dasgupta ()

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Abstract

Only a limited number of papers haveempirically examined the determinants of themonitoring and enforcement activities performedby the environmental regulator. Moreover, mostof these studies have taken place in thecontext of developed countries. In this paper,we empirically examine the determinants of theenforcement of pollution charges in China.More precisely, we seek to identify thecharacteristics which may give firms more orless bargaining power with local environmentalauthorities pertaining to the enforcement(collection) of pollution charges. Firms fromthe private sector appear to have lessbargaining power than state-owned enterprises.Firms facing an adverse financial situationalso appear to have more bargaining power.Finally, we also show that the higher thesocial impact of a firm's emissions (asmeasured by the presence of complaints), thesmaller the bargaining power of the firms withlocal environmental authorities. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1022936506398
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 245-262
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:24:y:2003:i:3:p:245-262

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Keywords: bargaining power enforcement

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E., 1996. "Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 96-111, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Porter, Richard C., 1988. "Environmental negotiation: Its potential and its economic efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 129-142, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ricketts, Martin & Peacock, Alan, 1986. "Bargaining and the regulatory system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 3-16, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Hua Wang & Wheeler, David, 1996. "Pricing industrial pollution in China : an econometric analysis of the levy system," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1644, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dasgupta, Susmita & Huq, Mainul & Wheeler, David, 1997. "Bending the rules : discretionary pollution control in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1761, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hua Wang & Ming Chen, 1999. "How the Chinese system of charges and subsidies affects pollution control efforts by China's top industrial polluters," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2198, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hua Wang & Wheeler, David, 2000. "Endogenous enforcement and effectiveness of China's pollution levy system," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2336, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  10. Dasgupta, Susmita & Laplante, Benoit & Mamingi, Nlandu & Wang, Hua, 2001. "Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 487-498, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1996. "Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal Regulator," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 233-253, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Pargal, Sheoli & Wheeler, David, 1996. "Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1314-27, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mary E. Deily & Wayne B. Gray, 1989. "Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry," Working Paper 8912, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1998. "Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 225-241, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dion, Catherine & Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit, 1998. "Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions Matter?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 5-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ahn, Seung C. & Schmidt, Peter, 1995. "Efficient estimation of models for dynamic panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 5-27, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Dean, Judith M. & Lovely, Mary E. & Wang, Hua, 2005. "Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3505, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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