Pigouvian Taxes Under Imperfect Competition If Consumption Depends on Emissions
AbstractThe paper considers environmental regulation of a consumption good and an externality which influence demand and costs in a nonseparable way. Under monopoly two instruments are always required for first-best. The Pigouvian tax is more complicated than anticipated. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
environmental regulation; imperfect competition; nonseparable utility; Pigouvian tax;
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