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Imperfect Competition In The Recycling Industry

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  • Thomas Eichner

Abstract

We study the market allocation in an economy where material is used for producing a consumption good, then recycled and finally landfilled, and where a recycling firm has market power. The material content constitutes an aspect of green product design and affects the recycling costs. Although the recycling firm's supply of recycling services is inefficiently low, it does not abuse its market power to distort the product design allocation. Different policy schemes are proposed which correct for market failures. One promising candidate is a relative recycling standard combined with a consumption good's tax, a material subsidy and a subsidy on recycling services.

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  • Thomas Eichner, 2005. "Imperfect Competition In The Recycling Industry," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 1-24, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:56:y:2005:i:1:p:1-24
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00204.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Yasuyuki Sugiyama & Patcharin Koonsed, 2019. "International recycling firm joint ventures and optimal recycling standards," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(3), pages 427-449, July.
    2. Cogoy, Mario, 2009. "A Model of Eco-Efficiency and Recycling," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 3, pages 1-30.
    3. Hajime Sugeta & Takayoshi Shinkuma, 2012. "International trade in recycled materials in vertically related markets," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(4), pages 357-382, October.
    4. Söderholm, Patrik, 2011. "Taxing virgin natural resources: Lessons from aggregates taxation in Europe," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 55(11), pages 911-922.
    5. Eiji B. Hosoda, 2014. "An Analysis of Sorting and Recycling of Household Waste: A neo-Ricardian Approach," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 58-94, February.
    6. Patrik Söderholm & Tomas Ekvall, 2020. "Metal markets and recycling policies: impacts and challenges," Mineral Economics, Springer;Raw Materials Group (RMG);Luleå University of Technology, vol. 33(1), pages 257-272, July.
    7. Kazuhiko Nishimura, 2008. "The Role And Internalization Of Homogeneous And Non‐Homogeneous Design Effects In Recycling Systems," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 110-130, May.
    8. Leonidas Milios, 2021. "Towards a Circular Economy Taxation Framework: Expectations and Challenges of Implementation," Circular Economy and Sustainability,, Springer.
    9. Belleflamme, Paul & Ha, Huan, 2021. "Improving recycling: How far should we go?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Yasuyuki Sugiyama & Patcharin Koonsed, 2017. "Environmental R&D, imperfectly competitive recycling market, and recycled content standards," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(4), pages 2970-2979.

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