This paper examines a Waste Management Organisation's (WMO) pricing options to implement the Pareto-efficient allocation in an economy where materials are first extracted, then used for producing a consumption good and finally recycled or landfilled. The WMO is established by the producers who are responsible for the proper disposal of consumption waste which consists of a mix of materials. That mix forms an aspect of the Producers' (green) product design and effects the productivity of secondary material generation. The most favorable pricing strategies are shown to comprise (positive or negative) fees on producers based on residuals and material inputs.
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Paper provided by Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht in its series Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitraege with number
83-99.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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