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Can we all be Denmark? The role of civic attitudes in welfare state reforms

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Celico

    (Universidad de Navarra. Economics Department. Campus Universitario)

  • Martin Rode

    (Universidad de Navarra. Economics Department. Campus Universitario)

Abstract

Research has demonstrated the economic effectiveness of welfare state reforms that follow the Danish flexicurity model, broadly specifying the combination of highly flexible labor market policies and generous protection schemes. Notwithstanding, it has also been argued that large and generous welfare states may erode civic attitudes, defined here as people’s willingness to cheat on taxes and claim transfers to which they are not entitled. Combining data from all available waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study with a self-constructed flexicurity index, this paper finds that welfare state reforms involving a combination of higher benefits, lower labor market regulations, and active labor market policies are not significantly associated with an erosion of civic attitudes.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Celico & Martin Rode, 2024. "Can we all be Denmark? The role of civic attitudes in welfare state reforms," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 87-125, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:51:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10663-023-09588-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-023-09588-7
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Welfare state reform; Flexicurity; Civic attitudes; Benefits and tax morale; Social trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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