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Hayekian welfare states: explaining the coexistence of economic freedom and big government

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  • Bergh, Andreas

Abstract

To explain the coexistence of economic freedom and big government, this paper distinguishes between big government in the fiscal sense of requiring high taxes, and big government in the Hayekian sense of requiring knowledge that is difficult to acquire from a central authority. The indicators of government size in measures of economic freedom capture the fiscal size but ignore the Hayekian knowledge problem. Thinking about government size in both the fiscal and Hayekian dimensions suggests the possibility of Hayekian welfare states where trust and state capacity facilitate experimentation and learning, resulting in a public sector that is big in a fiscal sense but not necessarily more vulnerable to the Hayekian knowledge problem. Pensions in Sweden are used as a case to illustrate the empirical relevance of the argument. The new pension system represents big government in a fiscal sense, but by relying on decentralized choice it requires relatively little central knowledge.

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  • Bergh, Andreas, 2020. "Hayekian welfare states: explaining the coexistence of economic freedom and big government," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-12, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:16:y:2020:i:1:p:1-12_1
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    Cited by:

    1. Magnus Henrekson & Anders Kärnä & Tino Sanandaji, 2022. "Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: coveted by policymakers but impervious to top-down policymaking," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 867-890, July.
    2. Andrea Celico & Martin Rode, 2024. "Can we all be Denmark? The role of civic attitudes in welfare state reforms," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 87-125, February.
    3. Feld, Lars P. & Nientiedt, Daniel, 2022. "Hayekian economic policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 457-465.
    4. Vincent Geloso & Chandler S. Reilly, 2022. "Did the ‘Quiet Revolution’ Really Change Anything?," CIRANO Working Papers 2022s-30, CIRANO.
    5. Carlo Ludovico Cordasco & Nick Cowen, 2024. "Market Participation, Self-respect, and Risk Tolerance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 591-602, January.
    6. J. Brandon Bolen & Russell S. Sobel, 2020. "Does Balance Among Areas of Institutional Quality Matter for Economic Growth?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1418-1445, April.
    7. Lucas, David S. & Boudreaux, Christopher J., 2020. "National regulation, state-level policy, and local job creation in the United States: A multilevel perspective," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(4).
    8. Christopher Boudreaux & Anand Jha & Monica Escaleras, 2021. "Weathering the Storm: How Foreign Aid and Institutions Affect Entrepreneurship Following Natural Disasters," Papers 2104.12008, arXiv.org.
    9. Vincent Geloso & Kelly Hyde & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2022. "Pandemics, economic freedom, and institutional trade-offs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 37-61, August.
    10. Justin T. Callais & Vincent Geloso, 2023. "Intergenerational income mobility and economic freedom," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 732-753, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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