IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v7y1996i4p257-265.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Blankart

Abstract

The state can be conceived as an organization to protect personal freedom and to provide public goods. Consequently, we expect a constitution to consist of two different sets of rules; rules on personal freedom and rules for making collective decisions on public goods (mostly budgetary rules). The constitution of the European Union as laid down in the treaty of Maastricht (1992) provides both types of rules, but the emphasis is mainly on the former rules. This paper investigates budgetary rules, in particular the welfare economic logic of deficit spending. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Blankart, 1996. "The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 257-265, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:7:y:1996:i:4:p:257-265
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00119266
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00119266
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00119266?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Charles B. Blankart & Christian Kirchner, 2003. "The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out," CESifo Working Paper Series 989, CESifo.
    2. Colombatto Enrico, 1998. "The Birth and Failure of the EMU Project," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2-3), pages 1-20, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
    3. Seitz, Helmut, 2000. "Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The Case of the German Laender," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 183-218, March.
    4. Jean-Paul Pollin & Jean-Luc Gaffard, 2013. "Pourquoi faut-il séparer les activités bancaires ?," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1cud3763mom, Sciences Po.
    5. Karin Mayr, 2006. "Optimal budget deficits and immigration," Economics working papers 2006-19, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    6. Francisco de Castro & José M. González-Páramo & Pablo Hernández de Cos, 2001. "Evaluating the dynamics of fiscal policy in Spain: patterns of interdependence and consistency of public expenditure and revenues," Working Papers 0103, Banco de España.
    7. John Considine & David Duffy, 2006. "Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 237-249, December.
    8. Jochimsen, Beate & Thomasius, Sebastian, 2014. "The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 390-408.
    9. Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini & Ugo Troiano, 2011. "Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design," Working Papers 397, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    10. Tarek Bouazizi & Zouhaier Hadhek & Mongi Lassoued, 2020. "General Government Balance Shocks and Their Impact on Some Tunisian Macroeconomics Variables: Evidence from a VAR Model," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 10(6), pages 69-83.
    11. Detken, Carsten, 1999. "Fiscal policy effectiveness and neutrality results in a non-Ricardian world," Working Paper Series 0003, European Central Bank.
    12. Ernest Dautovic, 2018. "The weight of the median voter ageing on public debt," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 69-92, March.
    13. Nouha Bougharriou, 2017. "Understanding Public Debt from a Political Economy Perspective," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 3, pages 379-389, September.
    14. Detken, Carsten, 1999. "Fiscal policy effectiveness and neutrality results in a non-Ricardian world," Working Paper Series 3, European Central Bank.
    15. Friedrich Heinemann, 2010. "Eine Gabe an St. Nimmerlein?– Zur zeitlichen Dimension der Schuldenbremse," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(3), pages 246-259, August.
    16. Derek Hung Chiat Chen, 2003. "Intertemporal excess burden, bequest motives, and the budget deficit," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3086, The World Bank.
    17. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 3-19, Summer.
    18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1cud3763momrc7c9o91o4g581 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Reiner Eichenberger & David Stadelmann, 2009. "Consequences of Debt Capitalization: Property Ownership and Debt/Tax Choice," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    20. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Envy and Inequality," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 949-973, September.
    21. Roozbeh Hosseini & Larry E. Jones & Ali Shourideh, 2009. "Risk Sharing, Inequality and Fertility," NBER Working Papers 15111, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    H2; H6;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:7:y:1996:i:4:p:257-265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.