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Eine Gabe an St. Nimmerlein?– Zur zeitlichen Dimension der Schuldenbremse

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  • Friedrich Heinemann

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems in the European Union and the US to act as an automatic stabilizer in the current economic crisis. We consider two scenarios: a proportional income shock and a shock on employment which increases the rate of unemployment. We find that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income shock in the EU, compared to 32 per cent in the US. In the case of an unemployment shock 48 per cent of the shock is absorbed in the EU, compared to 34 per cent in the US. Under the assumption that only credit constrained households adjust current spending on consumption goods to current disposable income, the cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabilization of 26 to 35 per cent in the EU and 19 per cent in the US. There is large heterogeneity within the EU. Automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Europe are much lower than in Central and Northern European countries. With respect to income stabilization, Germany is above the European average for both scenarios. Demand stabilization in Germany is weaker because the number of liquidity constrained households is below the EU average.

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  • Friedrich Heinemann, 2010. "Eine Gabe an St. Nimmerlein?– Zur zeitlichen Dimension der Schuldenbremse," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(3), pages 246-259, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:11:y:2010:i:3:p:246-259
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2010.00335.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Eckhard Janeba, 2012. "Germany´s New Debt Brake: A Blueprint for Europe?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(4), pages 383-405, December.
    2. Friedrich Heinemann & Theocharis Grigoriadis, 2016. "Origins of reform resistance and the Southern European regime," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 43(4), pages 661-691, November.
    3. Dörrenberg Philipp & Heinemann Friedrich & Khayal Nuri, 2015. "Reformoptionen für den deutschen Finanzföderalismus," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 26-43, March.
    4. Eric Mayer & Nikolai Stähler, 2013. "The debt brake: business cycle and welfare consequences of Germany’s new fiscal policy rule," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 39-74, February.
    5. Theocharis Grigoriadis & Friedrich Heinemann, 2013. "Origins of Reform Resistance and the Southern European Regime. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 20," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 46881, April.
    6. Streif, Frank & Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Schröder, Christoph, 2013. "Will the German Debt Brake Succeed? Survey Evidence from State Politicians," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80044, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Ciaglia, Sarah & Heinemann, Friedrich, 2012. "Debt rule federalism: The case of Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-067, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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