Consequences of Debt Capitalization: Property Ownership and Debt/Tax Choice
AbstractPublic debts capitalize into property prices. Therefore, property owners tend to favor tax over debt financing for government spending. In contrast, tenants do not suffer from debt capitalization. Thus, they tend to favor debt over tax financing. Our model of the resulting democratic fight between property owners and tenants over public debts and taxes predicts that the property ownership rate in a jurisdiction negatively effects the debt level. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis by analyzing a cross-section of the 171 communities in the Swiss Canton of Zurich in the year 2000.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2009-08.
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Public Debts; Homeownership; Taxes; Ricardian Equivalence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
- R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2009-03-28 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2009-03-28 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Somogyi, Frank & Sturm, Jan-Egbert, 2011.
"Tax competition and income sorting: Evidence from the Zurich metropolitan area,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 455-470, September.
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Frank Somogyi & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2009. "Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area," CESifo Working Paper Series 2824, CESifo Group Munich.
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Frank Somogyi & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2009. "Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area," KOF Working papers 09-240, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Frank Somogyi & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2009. "Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-25, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
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