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Constitutional politics within the interest-group model

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  • Daniel Sutter

Abstract

I examine constitutional politics using the interest-group model of politics. Constitutional economics argues that rent seeking is inevitable in majoritarian democracy and genuine reform is possible only at the constitutional level. By implication the constitutional equilibrium must differ from the political equilibrium. I examine reasons that such a difference might exist but find weak prospects for a general-interest victory over the special interest in constitutional politics. Although implicit constitutional change (for example, through Supreme Court reinterpretation) and explicit violation are substitute means of altering the constitution, the former dominates the latter. This suggests that a third factor participates in constitutional politics in addition to the general and special interests, which is support for the Constitution itself. Effective rules to restrain rent seeking need to ensure the congruence of the constitutional and general interests. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

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  • Daniel Sutter, 1995. "Constitutional politics within the interest-group model," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 127-137, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:6:y:1995:i:2:p:127-137
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01303253
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    2. Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1991. "Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 131-146, January.
    3. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    4. Charlotte Twight, 1988. "Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 131-152, February.
    5. Anderson, Gary M & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 215-228, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Sutter, 2003. "Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(4), pages 413-428, July.
    2. Cohen, Alon, 2014. "Independent judicial review: A blessing in disguise," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 209-220.
    3. Franke, Marcel, 2021. "Eine Verhandlung zur Selektion der konstitutionenökonomischen Lösung," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 03-2021, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.

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