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The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions

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  • Russell Sobel

Abstract

This paper uses the principles of constitutional economics to analyze the evolution of two international constitutions, the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. A graphical model is used to illustrate the formation and success of the international organizations created by these documents. This paper concludes that there were two factors that resulted in the failure of the League. They were the redistribution of power in favor of the smaller nations and the free-rider problem caused by the non-binding nature of the League's decisions. Amendments were proposed to the League's Covenant which may have fixed these problems, but they were never ratified. The reasons for the failure of the League had a strong influence on the wording of the U.N. Charter. The analysis in this paper is an extension of the tools provided by constitutional economics, which have mostly been applied to national constitutions. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Sobel, 1994. "The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 173-192, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:2:p:173-192
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393146
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Foundations of Government," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-13230-0.
    2. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ludwig Van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional Economics II," Chapters, in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Second Edition, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Russell S. Sobel, 1997. "The Distinction Between True and Induced Free Riders: an Application to Gatt de Facto Membership," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(4), pages 366-392, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    F02; H11; N40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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