Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 22 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Rational ignorance; Beliefs; Pressure group; Political failures; Irrationality; DO3; D83; D72;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- DO3 - Microeconomics - - - - -
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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